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INTRODUCTION
Tobacco products liability litigation has consisted of two
waves of suits, neither of which has brought appreciable success
to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs in the first wave of cigarette cases,
brought during the 1950s and 1960s, failed to record a single
victory because common law tort and warranty principles did
not support recovery at that time. The second wave, filed
during the 1980s, stalled due to the inadequacy of failure to
warn tort theories. This Note examines design defect theory as
an alternative basis for holding cigarette manufacturers liable
for injuries caused by smoking, and concludes that high-tar,
high-nicotine cigarettes are defectively designed because a
reasonable alternative design exists - the low-yield cigarettes
marketed by the tobacco companies themselves.
Accompanying the second wave suits is a growing impetus
for more effective, and indeed, more intrusive measures to
suppress cigarette consumption as a means of improving public
health. Renewed interest in the tobacco problem on the part of
the Surgeon General,' the Food and Drug Administration,
politicians, the media, physicians, and others makes 1994
potentially a watershed year in the fight to control tobacco use.'
The tobacco control effort encompasses a whole range of issues,
including taxation, product regulation, indoor air policies, and
underage access to cigarettes.3 Product liability litigation has
a role to play in this effort. Traditionally, this type of litigation
in tobacco cases has been unsuccessful due to the courts' special
treatment of cigarettes.4 This Note argues that the time has
come for the tobacco industry to face the same rules as every
other product manufacturer and that the Restatement (Third) of
Torts will help eradicate the notion that cigarettes, as a product,
deserve special treatment.
' See Antonia C. Novella, From the Surgeon General, U.S. Pub. Health
Serv., 270 JAMA 806 (1993).
2 See Philip J. Hilts, U.S. Agency Suggests Regulating Cigarettes as an
Addictive Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1994, at Al; Jolie Solomon, Smoke From
Washington, NEWSwEEK, Apr. 4, 1994, at 45.
' See Novella, supra note 1, at 806. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVS., REDUCING THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: 25
YEARS OF PROGRESS, A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GEN. 465-644 (DHHS Pub.
No. (CDC) 89-8411, 1989) [hereinafter 25 YEARS OF PROGESS] (providing a
broad overview of smoking control policies).
' See discussion infra Part I.E.1.
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While this Note explores the possibilities of opening a viable
theory of legal liability, it leaves unanswered some of the more
practical problems of tobacco litigation.5 Issues such as jury
selection and the superior resources of the tobacco companies
are of secondary importance when measured against the need to
establish a viable theory of legal liability.6 While litigation is
always an uncertain venture, victory for plaintiffs will eventual-
ly come - given the large number of potential lawsuits - once
courts recognize a strong theory of liability.
This Note focuses on the possibilities of establishing a
design defect cause of action under a reasonable alternative
design test. This theory has the potential for imposing liability
for injuries caused by smoking in large numbers of cases.' As
such, successful litigation under design defect theories may have
an enormous impact on the tobacco control effort generally, The
large number of potential plaintiffs, coupled with the serious-
ness of the injuries caused by smoking, may not create exposure
for tobacco companies that would compare to the losses sus-
tained by asbestos manufacturers in the asbestos litigation.8
The design defect theory proposed by this Note, however, would
hold manufacturers of the most dangerous cigarettes responsible
for the injuries caused by their products.9 The seriousness with
5 One problem with the failure to warn theory has been hostility of many
jurors to warning-based theories when they perceive that the dangers of
cigarette smoking are apparent. See Marcia Stein, Cigarette Products Liability
Law in Transition, 54 TENN. L. REV. 631, 670 (1987). Design defect theory
avoids this problem by focusing on the product and not on the consumer's
expectations.
6 But see id. Stein argues that the problem "now is not in getting to the
jury, but in getting across to the jury." Id. Of course, the Supreme Court
decision in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. (Cipollone I), 112 S. Ct. 2608
(1992) (preempting most failure to warn claims), made it more difficult to
reach the jury. See discussion infra Part I.C.2.
' This contrasts with warning theories, which are dependent on when the
plaintiff began smoking. See discussion infra Part I.C.2.
' See Christopher F. Edley, Jr. & Paul C. Weiler, Asbestos: A Multi-Billion
Dollar Crisis, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 383, 385 (1993) (noting the seven billion
dollars already spent and the resulting bankruptcies of 16 of the 25 major
corporate defendants in the asbestos litigation).
' Professors Henderson and Twerski, the Reporters for the Restatement
(Third) of Torts, have argued that it is "fantasy" to expect courts to "open their
doors to litigate the fate of politically unpopular products such as cigarettes
and alcoholic beverages" in the same way as they did in the asbestos cases.
James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Stargazing: The Future of
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which the tobacco companies have taken the litigation challenge
is ample testimony to the potential impact of successful product
liability suits.' By holding cigarette manufacturers liable for
the injuries caused by their products, prices for the more dan-
gerous cigarettes will surely rise, discouraging consumption if
consumers are unwilling to pay 'higher prices reflecting ciga-
rettes' true overall cost."
I. PRODUCTS LIABILITY DOCTRINE AND
ITS APPLICATION TO TOBACCO LITIGATION
A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts revolu-
tionized modern products liability law.12 Throughout the first
part of the twentieth century, liability for defective products
steadily broadened. The abandonment of the privity require-
ment in negligence actions 3 and then in implied warranty
actions," and the dispensing with particularized proof of negli-
American Products Liability Law, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1332, 1336-37 (1991)
[hereinafter Stargazing]. While Henderson and Twerski believe that "[c]ourts
will refuse to enter the political thicket to impose the kinds of liability that
likely would spell the death knell to such products [as cigarettes, alcohol, and
airbags]," id. at 1336, their analysis does not speak to liability on a reasonable
alternative design theory. See discussion infra Part III.A.1.
10 Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44
STAN. L. REV. 853, 857 (1992) (discussing the win-at-any-cost strategy taken
by cigarette manufacturers in defending all lawsuits).
" This conclusion is based on the cost-spreading economic model of tort
liability. If a product creates a liability for a manufacturer, but the product is
still profitable, the manufacturer will increase the price of the product to cover
the liability. For example, if one in every 10,000 widgets causes a consumer
to suffer $10,000 of bodily harm, and the manufacturer is held liable for this
amount, the price of widgets will increase slightly to reflect this new 'cost' of
the product. See William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1120 (1960).
12 See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed
Revision of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L.
REV. 1512, 1512-13 (1992) [hereinafter Revision of § 402A].
"3 See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916)
(holding defendant automobile manufacturer liable for negligence even though
plaintiff was not the immediate purchaser of the vehicle).
14 See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960)
(holding that the implied warranty of merchantability for an automobile
extends not only to the actual purchaser, but also to his family members and
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gence in some cases (res ipsa loquitur),15 signaled a movement
towards greater liability for manufacturers and sellers of defec-
tive products. Section 402A, drafted by Reporter William
Prosser, took a giant step forward by formulating a standard of
strict liability in tort. 6 When the American Law Institute
adopted section 402A in 1965, only California recognized strict
liability. 7 Within twenty years, virtually every jurisdiction
had embraced strict liability, with most adopting the very
language of section 402A.'
8
Under section 402A, a product must be "unreasonably
dangerous" and "defective" for strict liability to attach. This
formulation has applied to all three types of defect: manufac-
turing, design, and warning. 9 Simply put, "defective" means
that the product is in a "condition not contemplated by the
ultimate consumer."2 ' The additional requirement that a
product be "unreasonably dangerous" excludes from liability
products such as whiskey, butter, and tobacco, the dangers of
others using the automobile with his permission).
1 Res ipsa loquitur literally means "the thing speaks for itself." See, e.g.,
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 140 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944) (holding bottling
company liable under res ipsa loquitur even though plaintiff could not point to
any specific negligence on the part of defendant).
16 Section 402A of the second Restatement states that:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the
business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does
reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the
condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller
has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the product
from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
17 See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962)
(holding the manufacturer of a power tool strictly liable for injury sustained by
user).
18 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 221 (West 1964); Revision of
§ 402A, supra note 12, at 1512-13.
19 See discussion infra parts I.C to I.E.
20 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. g (1965).
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which are well known and accepted by consumers, but which
are at the same time not "entirely safe for all consumption.1
2
The "unreasonably dangerous" prong of 402A 2 has con-
fused courts and has been the source of a great deal of bad case
law23 that the new Restatement is attempting to correct.
24
However, the choice of this black letter language and the cre-
ation of a special category of exempted products was not inad-
vertent; rather the American Law Institute made a conscious
choice to avoid subjecting the tobacco industry to liability for
their harmful products. 25  The recorded proceedings of the
American Law Institute show that Dean Prosser adopted the
"unreasonably dangerous" and "defective" standard because the
potential liability of the tobacco industry concerned certain
advisors. 26 Discussing a draft of section 402A in 1961, in the
midst of the first wave suits, advisors to the Restatement
project feared that liability would destroy the tobacco indus-
try.27 The specific exemption for "good tobacco" in comment i
was the result.
28
B. FAILURE OF THE FIRST WAVE CASES
Beginning in 1954, smokers injured by the effects of ciga-
rette smoking sued, with the help of risk-taking personal injury
lawyers, the tobacco companies which had supplied them with
21 Id. cmt. i.
22 See id. for the genesis of the consumer expectations test: "[U]nreason-
ably dangerous... means dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer." Id.
' The consumer expectations test has been difficult to apply and has often
led to unfortunate outcomes. See W. Page Keeton, Products Liability: Design
Hazards and the Meaning of Defect, 10 CUMB. L. REV. 293, 302-05 (1979).
24 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994)
("[C]onsumer expectations do not constitute an independent standard for
judging the defectiveness of product designs.").
' Stein, supra note 5, at 641-42.
261 Id. at 642 (discussing 38 A.L.I. PROC. 87-88 (1961)).
27 Id.
' "The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer .... Good tobacco is not
unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may be
harmful; but tobacco containing something like marijuana may be unreason-
ably dangerous." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965).
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the product.29 Plaintiffs then, as now, faced a determined and
well-financed adversary that rejected any compromise." While
the tobacco companies' aggressiveness may have been a signifi-
cant factor in the failure of the first wave cases,"' plaintiffs
also faced a very different legal climate. Before 1965 and the
adoption of strict liability in section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, plaintiffs were forced to rely on traditional
common law principles of warranty and negligence, even though
courts had begun to hint at liability without fault.
32
Three of the fully litigated cigarette cases, Lartigue v. R.J.
Reynolds,3 Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 4 and
Green v. American Tobacco Co."5 from this first wave all failed
on negligence theories. 6 Courts at that time felt that the risk
of harm from cigarette smoking was not sufficiently foresee-
able,37 which eliminated the duty upon which negligence liabil-
ity depends.3" Theoretically, implied warranty of merchantabili-
2 Rabin, supra note 10, at 857. Lowe v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No.
9673(C) (E.D. Mo. filed Mar. 10, 1954), was the first of over 100 cases that
were filed in this wave of litigation and eventually dropped without formal
disposition. Id.
30 See id. Professor Rabin suggests that the tobacco defendants simply
wore the plaintiffs down through their superior resources.
31 Id. at 857-60 (describing ways in which the plaintiffs' attorneys were
outmatched by those attorneys working for the tobacco companies).
32 See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring) (arguing that public policy demands that the manu-
facturer incur absolute liability for placing a defective product on the market).
'3 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963).
34 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966).
35 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962).
3' Anthony J. Rossi, The Cigarette-Cancer Problem: The Plaintiffs Choice
of Theories Explored, 34 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 400 (1961).
17 See Richard A. Wegman, Cigarettes and Health: A Legal Analysis, 51
CORNELL L.Q. 678, 711-12 (1966) (citing Green, Lartigue, and Ross v. Philip
Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964)). It is ironic that defendants escaped
liability in the first wave on the grounds that the dangers of smoking were not
foreseeable, while in the second wave suits they argued that the obviousness
of the dangers should completely shield them from liability. Paul G. Crist and
John M. Majoras, who represent R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. in smoking and
health cases, make precisely this argument. See Paul G. Crist & John M.
Majoras, The "New" Wave in Smoking and Health Litigation - Is Anything
Really So New?, 54 TENN. L. REV. 551, 595 (1987).
s See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928)
([T]he risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed.").
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ty was a theory of liability that did not depend upon fault.39
Nevertheless, courts required plaintiffs in the first wave cases
to make fault-like showings such as foreseeability and reli-
ance.40 This approach resulted in reducing warranty theory in
the cigarette cancer cases to "nothing more than one of negli-
gence."4' This meant that plaintiffs had to overcome the diffi-
cult proof problems in making out a negligence claim.42
Just as negligence and warranty proved to be inadequate
doctrines in the first wave, the recognition of strict products
liability in section 402A did nothing to improve plaintiffs'
prospects. Comment i took from plaintiffs with one hand what
strict liability had given with the other.43 In fact, section 402A
and comment i "stopped the cigarette products liability litigation
in its tracks.
44
C. FAILURE TO WARN
A product may be defective because it lacks a sufficient
warning of its dangers. Specifically, if a product does not alert
the consumer or user to foreseeable risks of harm, courts may
impose liability on a seller or manufacturer of the product.45
" Wegman, supra note 37, at 710.
40 Id. at 710-11.
41 Rossi, supra note 36, at 411.
42 In a negligence regime, defendants are not always held responsible for
all their negligence, in part because plaintiffs frequently face difficulties in
proving all of the elements of the claim. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Coping
with the Time Dimension in Products Liability, 69 CAL. L. REV. 919, 932
(1981).
43 See discussion infra Part I.E.1.
"' See Stein, supra note 5, at 639. For example, Green v. American
Tobacco Co., 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969), a case which plaintiffs litigated for
12 years, finally died in 1969 when the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that comment i conclusively barred strict liability claims. The court had
rejected this position in an earlier opinion, 391 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1968). See
also Green v. American Tobacco Co., 391 F.2d 97, 106 (1968) (Simpson, J.,
dissenting) (agreeing with comment i that cigarettes are not unreasonably
dangerous simply because smoking may have harmful effects).
45 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2(c) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994).
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1. Prominence in Second Wave Suits
In the second wave suits, plaintiffs initially envisioned
failure to warn under section 402A as the most promising road
to victory.46 As discussed in the previous section, plaintiffs in
the first wave cases foundered on the difficulties of proving
negligence. Commentators saw the relaxation of proof for
failure to warn under strict liability as an opportunity to suc-
ceed where the first wave cases failedY In some jurisdictions,
strict liability does not require that the manufacturer have
actual or constructive knowledge of the product's dangers.48
This is consistent with the rhetoric of strict liability, namely
that the plaintiff impugns the product rather than the defend-
ant's behavior,49 and the defendant's fault is not at issue. Of
course, the smoker plaintiff still faces the jury's skepticism
when he argues that he should have been warned of a danger
that is widely known. ° Moreover, courts often balk at requir-
ing manufacturers to warn of "obvious" dangers.5
" In tobacco cases decided within the last ten years, failure to warn has
been the predominant theory advanced. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc. (Cipollone I), 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992); Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825
F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987); Stephen v. American Brands, Inc., 825 F.2d 312 (11th
Cir. 1987); Baker v. Liggett Group, Inc., 132 F.R.D. 123 (D. Mass. 1990);
Gianitsis v. American Brands, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 853 (D.N.H. 1988).
47 See Stein, supra note 5, at 662. Stein further notes that even under the
strict liability standard, proof of causation may be a difficult task. Id.
48 See Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982)
(stating that culpability is irrelevant in strict liability cases; the court need
ask only whether the product is reasonably safe for its foreseeable purposes).
49 See Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978) (holding
that a product must be evaluated in light of reasonably foreseeable uses, not
merely the manufacturer's intended uses).
50 See Crist & Majoras, supra note 37, at 557-59 (arguing that the dangers
of tobacco have been well known for years and that people smoke because they
enjoy it). Contra discussion supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text for the
irony of this position.
" See, e.g., Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 855 (1957). The Tentative Draft of the Restatement (Third)
of Torts also rejects warnings for known risks. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS § 2 cmt. g (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994). This approach is "supported
by an overwhelming majority of jurisdictions." Id. reporters' note (citations
omitted).
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2. Preemption by Federal Labeling Act
Despite the attractiveness of failure to warn theories,
defendants have challenged them as preempted by the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 196512 and the Pub-
lic Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969."3 The tobacco com-
panies argued that Congress had implicitly preempted state tort
law claims based on warning and advertising theories. They
succeeded in most cases; 4 however, some courts came to oppo-
site results,"5 and the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve the controversy. 6 The Supreme Court
held that the 1969 Act preempted virtually all warning-based
tort theories in cigarette litigation. 7 As a result, federal law
bars claims caused by post-1969 warning deficiencies. The
practical effect of this ruling is that failure to warn theories are
extremely difficult to litigate,8 and that plaintiffs should look
to establishing other causes of action.
D. MANUFACTURING DEFECTS
As a doctrinal matter, liability for injuries caused by manu-
facturing defects in mass-produced products is relatively uncon-
troversial. This type of defect occurs when "the product departs
52 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1988).
53 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1988) (requiring that no additional statement relating
to smoking and health be placed on cigarette packages beyond those mandated
by the Act).
' See, e.g., Pennington v. Vistron Corp., 876 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1989);
Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988); Palmer v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987); Stephen v. American Brands,
Inc., 825 F.2d 312 (l1th Cir. 1987); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d
181 (3d Cir. 1986) (interlocutory appeal in case that became Cipollone II).
" See, e.g., Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239 (N.J. 1990);
Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 437 N.W.2d 655 (Minn. 1989).
56 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1386 (1991), granting cert. to
893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990).
" Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. (Cipollone 11), 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2624
(1992).
" See Angela M. Lowell, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.: The Effect of the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act on State Common Law Claims,
16 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 477,491-92 (1992); Jason Crawford, Note, Overcoming
Tobacco Company Immunity: Cipollone Clears an Uncertain Path, 27 GA. L.
REV. 253, 262-270 (1992).
1994]
from its intended design."59  Thus a manufacturing flaw fits
easily within section 402A's "unreasonably dangerous" and
"defective" test.60 This type of defect can be characterized as a
"glitch" in the manufacturing process that causes a few products
from a product line to fail to perform as intended and conse-
quently to present dangers to consumers. 1
Manufacturing defects in tobacco products have long been a
source of tort liability in situations where the tobacco is impure.
Tobacco containing explosive materials62 or other foreign sub-
stances63 provides a clear basis for recovery. Comment i of
section 402A specifically noted that "tobacco containing some-
thing like marijuana may be unreasonably dangerous.16 4 As a
practical matter, however, manufacturing defects in cigarettes
are very rare; therefore only a few plaintiffs have brought suits
under this theory.65 In sum, manufacturing defect is a solid
theory of liability, but it does not cover cigarettes generally,
making it an insufficient means of recovery and an insignificant
part of the tobacco control effort.
E. DESIGN DEFECTS
Unlike manufacturing defects, design defects implicate an
entire product line. A manufacturer may fabricate a product in
accordance with the manufacturer's specifications, but the
question may remain "whether the specifications themselves
create unreasonable risks."6  In other words, the product
59 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2(a) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994).
' See, e.g., Singleton v. International Harvester Co., 685 F.2d 112, 115 (4th
Cir. 1981) (dictum). The court, in discussing § 402A and the contours of
products liability law, states that "[in manufacturing defect cases, the plaintiff
proves that the product is defective by simply showing that it does not conform
to the manufacturer's specifications." Id.
61 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994).
62 See Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. DeLape, 109 F.2d 598 (9th Cir.
1940).
' See, e.g., Caudle v. F.M. Bohannon Tobacco Co., 16 S.E.2d 680 (N.C.
1941) (tobacco containing fish hook raised a jury question as to manufacturer's
negligence).
6 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965).
' The only reported decisions involving manufacturing defects in tobacco
products are DeLape, 109 F.2d 598, and Caudle, 16 S.E.2d 680.
6 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994).
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performs as intended, but is nonetheless unreasonably danger-
ous. To evaluate the intended design, some external standard
is required.6" Courts have taken various approaches in estab-
lishing that external standard, and the scope of cigarette liabili-
ty varies with each approach.
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Section 402A,
Comment i
Section 402A's "defective" and "unreasonably dangerous"
standard - with its application to all types of defects - has
spawned confusing doctrine. Nevertheless, its application in
tobacco cases has been relatively straightforward. Comment i,
the provision that was formulated with tobacco litigation in
mind, specifically addresses tobacco in the design defect context:
"Good tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely because the
effects of smoking may be harmful; but tobacco containing
something like marijuana may be unreasonably dangerous. "68
The very language of comment i seems to reject conclusively
design defect liability for tobacco. Given the widespread adop-
tion of section 402A by statute or by judicial opinion, comment
i is often "the beginning and end of [the] analysis. 69
2. Consumer Expectations Test
If section 402A had the force of statute in all states, com-
ment i would conclusively bar all design defect liability for
tobacco products. However, most courts that have decided
cigarette cases look beyond comment i to evaluate the design
defect claim under the general test adopted by the given juris-
diction."0 Many jurisdictions construe the "unreasonably dan-
gerous" prong of section 402A to imply a "consumer expecta-
6' Design defects are unlike manufacturing defects, where the product fails
to meet its own specifications. See discussion supra Part I.D.
68 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965) (emphasis added).
69 Crist & Majoras, supra note 37, at 585. Some courts have dismissed
design defect claims for cigarettes simply by citing comment i. See Gunsalus
v. Celotex Corp., 674 F. Supp. 1149 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Hite v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 578 A.2d 417 (Pa. Super. 1990).
70 See, e.g., Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217 (1st Cir. 1990)
(applying Massachusetts' standard requiring a safer alternative design).
NEW THEORIES OF CIGARETTE LIABILITY
tions" test.71 The inquiry under this standard is whether the
product failed to perform as the average consumer would expect
it to perform. 72  Appellate courts applying this test to ciga-
rettes have rejected design defect causes of action. In
Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,74 the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit ruled that the defendant's cigarettes posed
no greater risks than those "known to be associated with smok-
ing." The court concluded that because tobacco has been used
for some 400 years, and knowledge of its dangers is "wides-
pread," the cigarettes which caused the plaintiffs injury were
not defective as a matter of law.75 It is unlikely that any court
will impose generic liability on tobacco under the consumer
expectations test.
76
3. Reasonable Alternative Design
Of the jurisdictions that reject the consumer expectations
test, most apply an alternative design test wherein the product
is defective if a reasonable alternative design would have
avoided plaintiff's injury.7' This approach is also known as
"risk-utility," because the issue is whether, in considering the
risk and utilities of the two competing designs, the alternative
design is a marginal improvement over the design at issue.7s
Courts that require a reasonable alternative design have re-
buffed smoker plaintiffs on the ground that they failed to offer
any proof of an alternative design to the defendants' ciga-
rettes.
79
71 See, e.g., Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 435 P.2d 806 (Or. 1967).
See id.; see also Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
13 See Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988);
Rogers v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 557 N.E.2d 1045 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
74 849 F.2d at 236.
7 5 Id.
7
1 See Crist & Majoras, supra note 37, at 587-90.
77 Revision of§ 402A, supra note 12, at 1532-34.
71 See Troja v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 488 A.2d 516 (Md. App. 1985)
(quoting Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955, 959 (Md. App. 1976)).
Unfortunately, the terminology has caused this standard to be confused with
broad-based risk-utility balancing, also referred to as O'Brien risk-utility,
which is discussed in Part I.E.4 of this Note.
71 See Kotler v. American Tobacco Co.,'926 F.2d 1217 (1st Cir. 1990); Miller
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 679 F. Supp. 485 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
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In one case, the plaintiffs did offer proof of a safer alterna-
tive design, but the court dismissed the claim because proximate
cause was not shown. The district court in Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc. (Cipollone I),8o considered plaintiff's offer of proof
that the tobacco industry could have marketed a "palladium
cigarette as early as 1971, which would have reduced
Mrs. Cipollone's risk of developing lung cancer by eight to
seventeen percent.8 2 Importantly, the court did not impugn
the design defect theory itself, but instead held that an eight to
seventeen percent chance of avoiding the injury did not satisfy
the proximate cause element.83 The court considered a New
Jersey case that had loosened traditional proximate cause
requirements by holding that plaintiffs need only show that the
defendant's nonfeasance was a "substantial factor" in producing
the injury,' rather than a greater than fifty percent "but for"
cause of the harm.85 However, the court in Cipollone I "pre-
dicted" that the New Jersey Supreme Court would not apply
this "lost chance" doctrine to product liability cases. 86 To sum-
80 683 F. Supp. 1487 (D.N.J. 1988).
81 The plaintiffs discovered that Liggett, Lorillard, Philip Morris and R.J.
Reynolds had researched the effect of palladium catalysts on reducing harmful
substances from cigarette smoke during the 1960s and that Liggett had
planned to market a palladium cigarette in the spring of 1978. The palladium
cigarette, in studies on mice, greatly reduced the risks of cancer, and was
characterized as a "safe" cigarette in internal memoranda. See Lee Gordon &
Carol A. Granoff, A Plaintiffs Guide to Reaching Tobacco Manufacturers:
How to Get the Cigarette Industry Off its Butt, 22 SETON HALL L. REV. 851,
884 (1992) (citing Additional Incriminating Documents Released, TPLR PRESS
RELEASE 1 (Tobacco Products Liability Project, Boston, Mass., March 26, 1988
Supp.) and discussing various plaintiffs exhibits from Cipollone I that are
available from the TPLR).
82 Cipollone 1, 683 F. Supp. at 1493.
83 Id. at 1495.
84 See Evers v. Dollinger, 471 A.2d 405 (N.J. 1984) (holding that delay in
failing to diagnose and render proper treatment increased risk to the dece-
dent).
' The Cipollone I court went on to hold that "defendant's conduct" must be
a "substantial factor" in producing the injury. 683 F. Supp. at 1494. The
court made clear that "substantial factor" in this context means that if the
defendant had used the alternative design, it would have prevented the
plaintiff's injury. Id. This is a very different conception of "substantial factor"
than that of the "lost chance" doctrine discussed infra note 86.
86 683 F. Supp. at 1494. Normally, the plaintiff must prove that, more
likely than not, the defendant caused in fact the plaintiffs injury. See Smith
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marize, this case shows that when plaintiffs put forth evidence
of "safer" cigarettes courts are willing to consider alternative
designs of cigarettes.
4. O'Brien87 Risk-Utility
In contrast to the use of risk-utility to balance competing
designs of the same product, O'Brien risk-utility considers
whether the product itself is generically defective. This extraor-
dinary concept was hatched by Professor John Wade who
advanced a list of seven factors to consider in determining
whether a product was "reasonably safe. '8  The first of these
factors - "usefulness and desirability of the product - its
utility to the user and to the public as a whole" - essentially
allows courts to ponder whether a company should have market-
ed the product at all.89
v. Rapid Transit Inc., 58 N.E.2d 754 (Mass. 1945) (Blue Bus Case). The "lost
chance" doctrine is an exception to this rule and has been a source of liability
only in medical malpractice cases when, although some cause other than the
one at issue in the case is greater than fifty percent responsible for an injury,
the doctor's negligence decreases the patient's chance for recovery. See
generally Darrell L. Keith, Loss of Chance: A Modern Proportional Approach
to Damages in Texas, 44 BAYLOR L. REV. 759 (1992).
87 O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1983).
8 John Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISs.
L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973).
89 Id. at 837. The other six factors are:
(2) The safety aspects of the product - the likelihood that it will
cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the
same need and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of
the product without impairing its usefulness or making it too
expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the
use of the product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in
the product and their avoidability, because of general public knowl-
edge of the obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of
suitable warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading




358 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol.3:343
O'Brien v. Muskin Corp.9" was the first judicial decision to
rely on Wade's seven factors and impose design defect liability
on a product when there was no alternative design, in other
words, no defect in the traditional sense.9 The plaintiff in
O'Brien was a young man who dove, uninvited, into a neighbor's
aboveground pool. He struck his head against the bottom of
pool, and sustained serious injuries.9 2 The plaintiff argued
that the vinyl bottom was so slippery as to constitute a design
defect, even though no alternative material was available.9"
Because the plaintiff conceded that the manufacturer could not
have made the product better, he sought recovery on the theory
that all aboveground pools are defective. The New Jersey
Supreme Court accepted this argument and held that a jury
question existed on whether "the risks of injury so outweighed
the utility of the product as to constitute a defect."94
The implication of O'Brien and other cases95 adopting its
rationale is that courts may find generic products defectively
designed. Under the O'Brien risk-utility standard, the issue
becomes whether the "product's usefulness outweighs its dan-
gers."96 Weighing the product's risks in this context is similar
to traditional risk-utility balancing under the reasonable alter-
native design standard discussed in the previous section. On
go 463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1983).
91 Courts used Dean Wade's factors in considering design defect questions,
but none found a defect in the absence of an alternative design. See, e.g.,
Troja v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 488 A.2d 516 (Md. 1985). The O'Brien court
reached its result because, under Wade's formulation, the existence of an
alternative design is only one factor to be considered.
92 463 A.2d at 302.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 306.
9' After O'Brien, Louisiana adopted this broad-based risk-utility standard
by imposing liability for injuries caused by asbestos products under a similar
analysis. See Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110 (La.
1986). Similarly, in Kelley v. R.G. Industries, Inc., 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985),
the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered whether to impose strict liability
on manufacturers of handguns known as "Saturday Night Specials." Looking
to federal and state gun regulations, the court concluded that, in light of the
product's extreme danger and minimal utility, the marketing of these hand-
guns was a wrongful act. Id. at 1159.
9' Mary Griffin, Note, The Smoldering Issue in Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc.: Process Concerns in Determining Whether Cigarettes Are a Defectively
Designed Product, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 606, 608-09 (1988).
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the utility side of the equation, however, the inquiry becomes a
comparison of a world with and without the product.9
For those who seek to suppress the consumption of a prod-
uct, the attractiveness of O'Brien risk-utility balancing is its
general indictment of that product, a judicial determination that
the world would be better off without it. 98 Nevertheless, plain-
tiffs in cigarette cases have largely failed to convince courts to
adopt the O'Brien test for tobacco.99 In Gianitsis v. American
Brands, Inc.,'00 the smoker plaintiff asked for a simple deter-
mination of whether he could state a cause of action under an
O'Brien design defect theory. The court emphatically declined
to adopt such an "expansive doctrine of strict products liabili-
ty."' '1  Noting that the plaintiff was candidly proposing a
theory of liability that could destroy an industry, the court
would not allow a design defect claim without proof of an
alternative design.0 2
The sole exception to this trend arose, not surprisingly, in
New Jersey, the jurisdiction in which O'Brien was decided. In
Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.," 3 a wrongful death ac-
tion, the plaintiffs asserted a general theory of design defect
based on O'Brien. The trial court allowed the plaintiffs to
attempt to prove that the "risks posed by cigarettes outweighed
their utility."'1 4 The Appellate Division and Supreme Court of
" See id. Collateral economic benefits of the product, such as employment
for those who manufacture it, cannot be considered as part of the product's
utility. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 283, 289-90 (D.N.J.
1986). Instead, the benefits to consumers may only be balanced against the
risks to those consumers. See id.
9 See generally Richard A. Daynard et al., Report of the Tobacco Policy
Research Study Group on Tobacco Litigation, TOBACCO CONTROL, 1992:1
(Supp.), at S37 (espousing "risk/utility" theory as part of a general effort to
suppress tobacco use).
" See, e.g., Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217 (1st Cir. 1990)
(applying Massachusetts law); Miller v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
679 F. Supp. 485 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Hite v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 578 A.2d
417 (Pa. Super. 1990).
100 685 F. Supp. 853 (D.N.H. 1988).
11Id. at 859.
102 Id. at 855-59. Pennsylvania courts have been similarly unreceptive to
broad-based risk-utility theory. See, e.g., Hite v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
578 A.2d 417 (Pa. Super. 1990).
103 523 A.2d 712 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986).
1
04 Id. at 717.
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New Jersey affirmed the ruling on the strength of O'Brien."5
Contained within the favorable decision on design defect
liability in Dewey, however, was dictum that New Jersey's new
products liability statute" 6 would have barred plaintiffs cause
of action. Ms. Dewey prevailed only because the New Jersey
statute, enacted in response to O'Brien, did not apply retroac-
tively.'0 7 The New Jersey legislature, concerned with the
expansion of liability under O'Brien, imposed an additional test
for design defect, the consumer expectations test. 08 The court
in Dewey noted that the plaintiff could not show that the "un-
safe aspect" of cigarettes was unknown, and held that liability
would not attach under consumer expectations.0 9 The Louisi-
ana legislature also overturned its courts' attempt to fashion
broad-based risk-utility." ' The result is that, aside from sev-
eral cigarette cases pending before the enactment of the New
Jersey statute, no jurisdiction applies the O'Brien rationale to
design defect cases.'
At the moment, O'Brien may be a dead letter, but tobacco
litigation may not have seen the last of the concept of categori-
cal liability. First, courts may be tempted to reimpose O'Brien
liability, especially when faced with a case involving an ex-
tremely dangerous product, such as cigarettes." 2 Second, it is
105 Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239 (N.J. 1990).
106 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3 (West 1989).
107 577 A.2d at 1255.
108 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3a(2) (West 1989).
109 577 A.2d at 1252-53 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3a(2)).
110 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.56(1) (West 1991) (requiring an
alternative design for design defect liability).
" See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. c, reporters' note (Tenta-
tive Draft No. 1, 1994).
112 The insight of O'Brien that there can be liability for very dangerous
products even though there is no alternative design will be difficult to eradi-
cate. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089 (5th
Cir. 1973) ("decision to market ... a product requires a balancing of the
product's utility against its . . . dangers") (dictum); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1328 n.5 (Or. 1978) (categorical liability possible).
Indeed, an earlier draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts left open the
possibility of liability without alternative design in extreme cases where the
product's dangers dwarfed its utility (e.g., toy guns that could cause serious
bodily injury). RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. c (Council Draft
No. 1A, 1994). The Council of the American Law Institute voted down this
position, but the persistence of the debate demonstrates that O'Brien still has
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very possible that the Food and Drug Administration will
regulate cigarettes as a drug, which would almost certainly
result in a total ban because cigarettes are "too hazardous." '113
This pronouncement would make categorical liability persuasive
because courts would be following the lead of a quasi-legislative
body, similar to the concept of negligence per se where conduct
prohibited by statute is, by definition, negligence. 14
While the clear trend has been away from design defect
liability in the absence of an alternative design, wholesale
rejection of categorical liability would be unwise policy."5
Such a policy might completely shield from liability products
which are by nature egregiously dangerous, while subjecting
other, safer products to countless suits simply because those
products could have been designed a little better. The absence
of an alternative design may indicate more than anything else
the product's overall danger and lack of utility. The end result
is that cigarettes, which have "little social utility, meet no
preexisting consumer needs and contribute to at least 350,000
deaths per year,""' 6 may escape liability altogether."1
The new Restatement clearly rejects O'Brien," but none-
theless imposes a type of broad-based risk-utility on a specific
product category, prescription drugs." 9 Under section four of
the Tentative Draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, manu-
facturers and sellers of prescription drugs and medical devices
may be held liable if:
some influential proponents.
"1 See Philip J. Hilts, U.S. Agency Suggests Regulating Cigarettes as an
Addictive Drug, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 26, 1994, at Al.
114 See Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814, 815 (N.Y. 1920) (Cardozo, J.).
"5 But see James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the
American Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without
Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263, 1297-1328 (1991) [hereinafter Liability
Without Defect] (arguing against categorical liability and predicting the demise
of O'Brien).
"' Stein, supra note 5, at 631 (footnotes omitted) (citing Kenneth E.
Warner, The Economics of Smoking: Dollars and Sense, 83 N.Y. ST. J. MED..
1273 (1983)).
117 One commentator has proposed the development of a new tort specifi-
cally designed to cover products such as tobacco. See A.A. White, The Inten-
tional Exploitation of Man's Known Weaknesses, 9 HOUs. L. REV. 889 (1972).
118 See discussion infra part II.A.
119 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 4(b)(4) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994).
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The foreseeable risks of harm... were sufficiently great
in relation to its therapeutic benefits as to deter a rea-
sonable medical provider, possessing knowledge of such
foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, from pre-
scribing the drug or medical device for any class of
patients. 2 °
This standard does not inquire into the costs and benefits of a
reasonable alternative design of the drug, but instead looks to
the overall risks and utility of the drug itself to determine
whether doctors should ever prescribe it. This is an approach
analogous to that of O'Brien.'2 ' In fact, the principal case
relied upon in section 4(b)(4) is Tobin v. Astra Pharmaceutical
Prods., Inc.,122 where the court held that a design defect claim
could succeed if, in light of the known risks, the product manu-
facturer should not have marketed the drug at all. 2 ' This
theory is precisely what plaintiffs injured by egregiously dan-
gerous products assert.
Because broad-based risk-utility is available for some
products under the new Restatement, the issue becomes why
other products, such as cigarettes, are not subject to a similar
standard. It seems bizarre that egregiously dangerous products
should receive preferential treatment over prescription drugs
and medical devices. Whereas prescription drugs are at least
intended to improve human health, cigarettes, aboveground
pools, and handguns bring about only marginal social benefits.
Tort reform advocates criticize products liability for discourag-
ing the introduction of useful products onto the market."
The tort system should not encourage the production of ciga-
rettes, while discouraging innovation in the area of prescription
drugs and medical devices.
On the other hand, the strong arguments against the
concept of categorical liability should not be minimized. 25 In
12
1 Id. (emphasis added).
121 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 4 cmt. f, reporters' note (Tentative
Draft No. 1, 1994).
122 993 F.2d 528 (6th Cir. 1993).
123 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 4(b)(4), reporters' note (Tentative
Draft No. 1, 1994).
124 PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE
REFORM IN AMERICA 3 (Aug. 1991) (report of the Quayle Comm'n).
" See Liability Without Defect, supra note 115.
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the cigarette context, Paul Crist and John Majoras, lawyers for
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., have argued that the federal stat-
ute2 ' which has preempted warning' and advertising
claims 2 also preempts broad-based risk-utility theories. 2 '
Congress, they assert, has already performed the risk-utility
balancing for cigarettes and has concluded that "cigarettes,
properly labelled, may lawfully be sold.' ' 129 Crist and Majoras
say, in effect, that Congress has implicitly determined that the
benefits of cigarettes outweigh their risks, so the courts should
defer to the legislature on this issue. Similarly, the market can
be seen as performing an a priori risk-utility balancing func-
tion- if a product is available on the market, society has
decided that the utility of the product outweighs its risks.
The new Restatement and some commentators have taken
a different tack, criticizing O'Brien from a legal process stand-
point. Specifically, they view the decision of whether a product
should or should not be available as one that the judiciary is not
equipped to make. 30 Given the superior ability of legislatures
and administrative agencies to investigate complex questions of
fact, these entities are better equipped to handle "polycentric"
issues."' 1 Polycentric issues, such as the desirability of ciga-
rettes, are considered non-justiciable 3 2 because courts cannot
decide them with the normal application of legal principles.'33
O'Brien presents problems for courts because "[t]he comparison
of a product with [a] no product alternative involves an over-
whelming number of competing value choices."'134  For these
126 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1988).
127 See discussion supra part I.C.2.
12 See Crist & Majoras, supra note 37, at 581.
2 See id.
110 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 1,
1994); Liability Without Defect, supra note 115, at 1300-08; Griffin, supra note
96, at 619-22.
131 See generally Griffin, supra note 96, at 620-23 (describing the difficulties




2 See id. at 621 n.76.
"3s See generally James A. Henderson, Jr., Process Constraints in Tort, 67
CORNELL L. REv. 901 (1982) (discussing how limitations on tort liability can
sometimes be explained in terms of the judiciary's inability to handle certain
issues).
4 Griffin, supra note 96, at 621; see id. at 619-22.
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reasons, legislatures or agencies should arguably be charged
with imposing broad-based tort liability.
135
Under any theory of generic liability, smoker plaintiffs
would fare well,'36 but it seems that the strong arguments in
favor of O'Brien-type liability simply have not persuaded the
courts or many commentators.'37 Professors Henderson and
Twerski predict that "the movement to declare products ...
categorically defective will be over and done with well before the
end of the century.' 138' The position of the new Restatement
will reinforce the requirement of a reasonable alternative
design, notwithstanding the anomalous treatment of prescrip-
tion drugs.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS
Just as the Restatement (Second) of Torts greatly influ-
enced the development of modern products liability law, the
Restatement (Third) of Torts will most likely have a significant
effect, particularly in determining the viability of design defect
theories as applied to cigarettes. Professors James
Henderson 39 and Aaron Twerski 4 ° are the Reporters for the
products liability sections of the new Restatement. Both have
actively attempted to clarify design defect and failure to warn
135 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 1,
1994).
136 "Plaintiffs can argue that cigarettes serve no independent need and that
cigarette smoking is addictive and self-perpetuating. Consumers continue to
smoke, not to relax or to lose weight, but simply to alleviate the discomfort of
not smoking." Stein, supra note 5, at 667 (citations omitted).
17 See, e.g., Liability Without Defect, supra note 115, at 1329-30; Note,
Handguns and Products Liability, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1912, 1915-20 (1984);
Stephen J. Foley, Jr., Note, Products Liability - Strict Liability in
Tort - State-of-the-Art Evidence Relevant to Risk-Utility Analysis in Design
Defect Cases - O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298 (1983), 15
SETON HALL L. REV. 120, 142-44 (1984); Kim D. Larsen, Note, Strict Products
Liability and the Risk-Utility Test for Design Defect: An Economic Analysis,
84 COLUM. L. REV. 2045, 2067 (1984).
138 Stargazing, supra note 9, at 1336 ("We have little doubt that the
attempts by some courts to use risk-utility analysis to impose liability on
entire product categories in the absence of feasible alternative designs are
doomed to failure.").
139 Frank B. Ingersoll Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
140 Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
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doctrine over the past twenty years.' 4 ' Rather than reworking
the essence of section 402A and American products liability law,
Henderson and Twerski are seeking to reduce the vague "defec-
tive" and "unreasonably dangerous" standard to functional tests
for determining defect. 42
A. REJECTION OF O'BRIEN
Professors Henderson and Twerski reject O'Brien risk-
utility balancing in the new Restatement. 4 3 Sensitive to pro-
cess concerns'" in pronouncing entire product categories de-
fective, the Tentative Draft of the new Restatement finds the
O'Brien approach unsupported in the case law and unwise as a
matter of policy. 45  Now that the new Restatement has
achieved Tentative Draft status, it will undoubtedly influence
judicial decisions, and plaintiffs will face an uphill battle in
trying to invoke broad-based risk-utility for any product, includ-
ing tobacco.
B. REASONABLE ALTERNATiVE DESIGN
The Restatement (Third) of Torts instead proposes a reason-
able alternative design standard 46  for design defect
claims. 47 Specifically, liability will attach under a design
defect theory when:
141 See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal
Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 265 (1990); Liability Without Defect, supra note 115.
142 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 1,
1994); see also Stargazing, supra note 9, at 1513, 1526-29 (discussing the
problems and unresolved issues surrounding the modem application of
§ 402A).
143 See id. § 2(b) (basing design defect liability on a showing of a reasonable
alternative design). Illustration 4 of comment c tracks the O'Brien facts and
concludes that without any alternative design the plaintiff "has failed to
establish a case of defective design under Subsection 2(b)." Id. § 2 cmt. c,
illus. 4.
144 See id. § 2 cmt. c.
145 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. d, reporters' note (Tentative
Draft No. 1, 1994).
146 See discussion supra part I.E.3.
147 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2(b) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994).
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The foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product
could have been reduced by the adoption of a reason-
able alternative design by the seller or a predecessor in
the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission
of the alternative design renders the product not rea-
sonably safe.
14
The key issue under this rule is a determination of whether the
alternative design proposed by the plaintiff is "reasonable."
This determination is made by a risk-utility analysis that
compares the two versions of the product. The alternative
design must be one that would have "reduced the foreseeable
risks of harm posed by the product" at an acceptable cost.
149
Comment d to section two sets forth a non-exhaustive list of
nine factors 5 ° to guide courts in deciding whether a product
is defectively designed. At trial, the jury must determine
whether the alternative design, on balance, provides net bene-
fits to the product, remembering that the alternative design
must increase overall safety. The design cannot simply avoid
the plaintiffs injury while making the product more dangerous
in other respects. The failure to limit the number of factors,
and the failure to prioritize the nine factors listed,'5 ' will
probably improve plaintiffs' chances of reaching the jury on
design defect claims by muddying the waters enough to avoid
summary judgment.'52
141 Id. (emphasis added).
149 Id. § 2 cmt. c.
"' Id. § 2 cmt. d. The nine factors are: (1) magnitude of foreseeable risks;
(2) nature and strength of consumer expectations; (3) effects of alternative
design on cost of production; (4) effects of alternative design on product
function; (5) advantages and disadvantages of the proposed safety features;
(6) effects on product longevity; (7) maintenance and repair; (8) esthetics; and
(9) marketability. The comment states that these factors are included in, but
not exhaustive of, the "broad range of factors [that] may legitimately be
considered in determining whether an alternative design is reasonable and
whether its omission renders a product not reasonably safe." Id.
151 Cf. Sec'y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529 (7th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 898 (1988) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (arguing that multi-
factor tests tend to raise jury questions whereas simple legal rules allow trial
courts to decide cases as a matter of law).
1-2 These criteria could also open the door to substantial differences among
jurisdictions on the defectiveness of similar products, since courts will inevita-
bly weigh the factors differently.
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C. CAUSATION UNDER THE NEW RESTATEMENT
The Tentative Draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts
includes a provision regarding causation that may be significant
for cigarette cases that assert an alternative design. Section six
of the new Restatement allows recovery when the design defect
"increases the harm" to the victim.15 In other words, the
plaintiff may have suffered some injury absent the defect, but
the defect "enhanced" her injury.' Under section six, defen-
dants would be liable for the increased harm.
155
In Cipollone I, the one case in which the plaintiff attempted
to prove an alternative design, the court directed a verdict for
the defendants on the design defect claim, based on a failure to
show proximate cause.'56 While the plaintiff made a showing
that the alternative design would have reduced her chances of
developing lung cancer by eight to seventeen percent, the court
held that these percentages were too low to satisfy the proxi-
mate cause element of her claim.
157
Under the new Restatement, a plaintiff alleging the same
facts as the plaintiff did in Cipollone I" 8 could argue that an
eight to seventeen percent increase in her susceptibility to lung
cancer meets the increased harm/enhanced injury test for
proximate cause, even if the alternative design would not have
prevented her lung cancer altogether. It is an open question,
however, whether this rule would apply to products like ciga-
rettes. Comment a of section six notes that most "enhancement"
of injury cases involve automobile crashworthiness, although it
states that this theory "may arise with other products.' 59
153 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 6(a) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994)
(emphasis added).
114 Id. § 6 cmt. b.
55 Id. § 6 cmt. d ([S]ubsection 6(c) provides that when plaintiff has proved
[the] defect caused [an] increase in harm, the product seller is subject to
liability for all the harm suffered by the plaintiff when proof does not support
apportionment of liability between the product seller and non-defect-related
causes that contributed to the plaintiffs harm.").
156 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 1487, 1495 (D.N.J. 1988);
see supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
157 683 F. Supp. at 1495.
5 8 Id. at 1489-93.
119 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 6 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 1,
1994).
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Unfortunately, the comments give almost no guidance on section
six's relevance to products other than motor vehicles.
D. REJECTION OF COMMENT i
Finally, the new Restatement effectively overturns comment
i of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 6 ° by
discarding the per se rule of comment i, and allowing plaintiffs
to show a reasonable alternative design for products such as
"alcoholic beverages, tobacco, small firearms and aboveground
swimming pools."'' While the new Restatement precludes
O'Brien liability for such egregiously dangerous products, it
opens the door to a traditional design defect cause of action.
This rule for egregiously dangerous products reflects a more
sound rationale than the one underlying comment i. As dis-
cussed above, imposing liability for generic product defects is a
major expansion of design defect doctrine. Consequently, courts
and legislatures have hesitated to adopt the O'Brien approach,
realizing that broad-based risk-utility could eliminate certain
products from the market. These concerns explain the rejection
of per se liability.
On the other hand, comment i espoused per se immunity,
premised in part on the notion that "tobacco cancer victims
[were] like allergic or hypersensitive consumers." '162 Given
this assumption, manufacturers or sellers would owe no duty to
the small percentage of people adversely affected by the prod-
uct."'63 This explains comment i's grouping together of tobacco,
sugar (for diabetics), and good whiskey (for alcoholics).'" By
this time, the notion that tobacco induces cancer in only a small
percentage of its users can be rejected out of hand.'65 The
,60 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965); see discussion
supra Part I.E.1.
161 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994)
(emphasis added).
162 See Stein, supra note 5, at 665 n.230 (discussing W. Page Keeton's
approach to cigarettes and products liability).
16 See id.
164 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965).
'65 See 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS, supra note 3, at 33-116. The Surgeon
General concluded that "smoking is responsible for more than one of every six
deaths in the United States." Id. at i.
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new Restatement's approach rests on firmer footing, eschewing
both per se liability and per se immunity.
III. PRACTICABILITY AND DESIRABILITY
OF DESIGN DEFECT LITIGATION
This Part analyzes the possibilities of design defect litiga-
tion, and raises a number of arguments that bolster the applica-
bility of design defect theory to cigarette cases. In addition, this
section considers the usefulness of product liability litigation as
part of the general tobacco control effort.
A. ANALYSIS OF A DESIGN DEFECT CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER A
REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE DESIGN TEST
The background section of this Note demonstrated how
most courts have adopted the reasonable alternative design
standard for design defect claims. 166 The Tentative Draft of
the Restatement (Third) of Torts indicates that this rule will
continue to be the trend in products liability law. 167 The is-
sues for tobacco litigation are (1) whether plaintiffs can adduce
proof of alternative designs of cigarettes and (2) whether the
utilities of these designs outweigh their risks.
1. Applying Reasonable Alternative Design to Cigarettes
Cigarettes, due to the tobacco industry's own efforts, are not
generic products. Current brands range widely in their tar and
nicotine content,168 two of the substances which make ciga-
rettes so harmful to human health.'69 "Low tar" cigarettes,
and other designs, including more effective filters, already exist
on the market, allowing plaintiffs to show an alternative,
technologically feasible design. Defendant tobacco companies
See discussion supra part I.E.3.
16 See discussion supra part II.B.
1>8 See generally FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, TAR, NICOTINE, AND CARBON
MONOXIDE OF THE SMOKE OF 568 VARIETIEs OF DOMESTIC CIGARETrES (1993)
[hereinafter FTC REPORT]. Carlton "King Filters" contain 1 mg of tar and 0.1
mg of nicotine, whereas the Philip Morris "Commander" contains 27 mg of tar
and 1.7 mg of nicotine. Id. at 3, 9 app. (Tables).
169 Cf Thomas C. Schelling, Addictive Drugs: The Cigarette Experience,
255 Sci. 430 (1992) (detailing the addictive nature of nicotine).
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will have trouble disputing this point, because they have devel-
oped these different designs themselves. The crucial question is
whether plaintiffs can avoid summary judgment and present
their case to the jury. If plaintiffs can consistently reach the
jury, it seems certain that they will eventually carry their
burden of persuasion and recover for their injuries.
170
To avoid dismissal, plaintiffs must show that low-yield
cigarettes increase safety at an acceptable cost. 171  In fact,
lower-yield cigarettes are associated with a lower risk of lung
cancer, 172 even though the risk of heart disease is undimin-
ished. 73  A conceptual key to the plaintiffs proof is the fact
that cigarette smoking has a dose-response relationship with a
number of diseases, meaning that, in a population, higher levels
of smoking tend to produce more lung cancer.174  Therefore,
the reduction in the amount of tar from 40 mg, the average
yield for cigarettes in 1950,1" to 1 mg for the lowest-yield
cigarettes produced today,' 6 should presumably result in an
170 Of course, a jury question, by definition, is one on which reasonable
minds can differ. Repeat litigation on the reasonableness of alternative
designs for cigarettes will yield eventual victory, even if the odds for any one
case are less than 50 %.
171 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 1,
1994). Admittedly, this is a significant barrier to recovery, since it is disputed
whether "light" cigarettes are safer at all. See John Slade et al., Report of the
Tobacco Policy Research Study Group on Tobacco Products, TOBACCO CON-
TROL, 1992:1 (Supp.), at S5. Indeed, many tobacco control advocates view
attempts to promote seemingly safer alternatives as a cynical ploy by manu-
facturers to keep customers smoking. See id.; see also Wegman, supra note 37,
at 680-81.
172 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENC-
ES OF SMOKING: THE CHANGING CIGARETTE, A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GEN.
81-87 (figs. 1 & 2) (1981) [hereinafter THE CHANGING CIGARETTE].
171 See 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS, supra note 3, at 183; see also Neal L.
Benowitz, Health and Public Policy Implications of the "Low-yield" Cigarette,
320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1619, 1619-20 (1989).
174 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS, supra note 3, at 43-46; THE CHANGING CIGA-
RETTE, supra note 172, at 6-8.
'75 Id. at 80.
176 Benowitz, supra note 169, at 1620. Today, the disparities between high-
yield and low-yield cigarettes are still large. For example, "Winston Filters"
contain up to 18 times the amount of tar and 15 times the amount of nicotine
of lower yield cigarettes. See FTC REPORT, supra note 168, at 13 (Winston
"King Filters" have 18 mg of tar and 1.5 mg of nicotine, while Carlton "King
Filters" have 1 mg of tar and 0.1 mg of nicotine).
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enormous reduction in smoking-related lung cancer in the
population that now smokes the low-yield cigarettes. However,
the actual effects of lower-yield cigarettes are far from propor-
tional because smokers tend to inhale more deeply when smok-
ing low-yield cigarettes.'17
Of course, it is the empirical proof of lowered risk of lung
cancer that is essential for plaintiffs. Studies comparing the
mortality rates for smokers of high, medium, and low-yield
cigarettes demonstrate that, for both sexes, the risk of lung
cancer is twenty to forty percent lower for low-yield smokers
than for high-yield smokers. 7 s These studies defined low-
yield to be less than 17.6 mg of tar, which included many
cigarettes that today would be high-yield.'79 Moreover, no
studies have measured the effect of smoking today's "ultra-low"
yield cigarettes, which contain as little as 1 mg tar and 0.1 mg
nicotine.
180
Under the risk-utility balance, the reasonableness of an
alternative design depends in part on the utility of the alterna-
tive version of the product.' 8' For example, the micronite
filter, introduced during the 1950s in Kent cigarettes, decreased
the attractiveness of the product, and consumers complained
that smoking a Kent was like "smoking through a mat-
tress."'82 The decreased "pleasure" of low-yield cigarettes will
be the most effective ammunition for tobacco companies in
defending design defect claims. Cigarette manufacturers will
177 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS, supra note 3, at 85; see also Schelling, supra
note 169, at 432. Without attempting to prove that low-yield cigarettes will
bring proportionate benefits, plaintiffs can argue that the jury should properly
consider whether the alternative design increases overall safety in light of
these disparate levels of tar and nicotine.
178 See Benowitz, supra note 173, at 1620 (citing THE CHANGING CIGA-
RETrE, supra note 172; Participants of the Fourth Scarborough Conference on
Preventative Medicine, Is There a Future for Lower-Tar Yield Cigarettes?,
2 LANcET 1111, 1111-14 (1985); D.W. Kaufman et al., Tar Content of Ciga-
rettes in Relation to Lung Cancer, 129 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 703, 703-11
(1989)).
179 See THE CHANGING CIGARETTE, supra note 172, at 81.
o See Benowitz, supra note 173, at 1620.
181 The Tentative Draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts discusses "the
nature and strength of consumer expectations" as a factor in considering the
reasonableness of the alternative design. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS
§ 2 cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994).
182 See Wegman, supra note 37, at 681.
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most likely argue that smokers seek precisely the characteristics
that low-yield cigarettes lack, making them a poor substitute
and an unreasonable alternative.
Cigarette manufacturers will probably take the position
that the "decreased attractiveness" of low-yield cigarettes is so
great that it will overwhelm the decreased cancer rates.
183
Moreover, the popular perception is that smoker preferences for
high-yield cigarettes are, in fact, deeply ingrained.1 4 Howev-
er, a historical perspective shows that since 1950, tobacco
companies have radically altered cigarettes to deliver far less
tar and nicotine.1 5  Before 1950, filter cigarettes were un-
available, but within fifteen years, they had gained acceptance
by the majority of smokers, 186 and today occupy almost the
entire market.' From 1950 to 1987, the average yield of tar
and nicotine underwent a similar transformation, with tar
decreasing from 40 mg 8 8 to 13 mg,18 9 and nicotine decreas-
ing from 2.2 mg 90 to 0.9 mg.'9 ' Indeed, the high-yield ciga-
rettes of today (18 mg of tar), which tobacco companies might
argue are irreplaceable in the eyes of consumer, were the low-
yield cigarettes of the 1960s.' 92
"a Cf Crist & Majoras, supra note 37, at 559. Crist and Majoras, who
serve as counsel to R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. in smoking and health cases,
argue that tobacco use is remarkably resilient, despite societal admonitions to
stop. Id. This notion of smokers' ingrained and stubborn preferences is used
to argue that any alternative design would be inadequate.
1 See Lynn T. Kozlowski, Evidence for Limits on the Acceptability of
Lowest Tar Cigarettes, 79 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 198, 198 (1989).
185 W.S. Rickert, "Less Hazardous" Cigarettes: Fact or Fiction?, 83 N.Y. J.
MED. 1269, 1269-70 (1983); see THE CHANGING CIGARETTE, supra note 172, at
5.
18 See Wegman, supra note 37, at 681. The widespread acceptance of filter
cigarettes is significant in light of the fact that consumers originally perceived
them as "harder to inhale, less aromatic, and yield[ing] less of a kick." Ruth
Brecher et al., THE CONSUMERS UNION REPORT ON SMOKING AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 128 (1963); see also Rickert, supra note 185, at 1269-70.
187 THE CHANGING CIGARETTE, supra note 172, at 214 (fig. 9).
188 Id. at 80.
189 Benowitz, supra note 173, at 1619.
11o THE CHANGING CIGARETTE, supra note 172, at 80.
191 Benowitz, supra note 173, at 1619.
192 See id. at 1620.
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The perception of lower health risks from low-yield products
explains these trends. 9 3 These trends show that lower yields
may increase the attractiveness of the product by soothing
smokers' fears about the health consequences of their habit.
9 4
This temporal view of consumer preferences is an important
component of the plaintiffs case. It challenges the assumption
of smoker inflexibility and adds another factor to the risk-utility
analysis, making it more difficult for courts to determine, as a
matter of law, that low-yield cigarettes are not a reasonable
alternative design.
In addition, the attractiveness of cigarettes is not limited to
their physiological effects. Indeed, cigarette smokers seek to
conform to peer pressure, project a certain image, and occupy
their hands.'95 The low-yield cigarette delivers these per-
ceived benefits as well as its high-yield counterpart. Alternative
cigarette designs do not eviscerate the product's utility, only
diminish it to some degree for some consumers.9
193 See Kenneth E. Warner & John Slade, Low Tar, High Toll, 82 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 17, 17 (1992) (citing FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N STAFF REPORT ON
THE CIGARETTE SMOKING ADVERTISING INvEsTIGATION (1981)). Warner and
Slade state that smokers perceive low-yield cigarettes as having lower risk
than high-yield cigarettes. Id. They also state that smokers perceive moder-
ate use of low-yield cigarettes as being virtually risk free. Id.
'9' See Benowitz, supra note 173, at 1620; see also Wegman, supra note 37,
at 680-81. See generally 25 YEARs OF PROGRESS, supra note 3, at 259-378
(Chapter 5: Changes in Smoking Behavior and Knowledge About Determi-
nants).
' Cf Neal D. Benowitz, Cigarette Smoking and Nicotine Addiction, 76
MED. CLINICS N. AM. 415, 418-19 (1992) (discussing behavioral, personal, and
social factors contributing to the attractiveness of cigarettes to consumers).
'9' After weighing the costs and benefits of low-yield cigarettes, the factual
issue of the reasonableness of the alternative design is inconclusive. In this
context, a smoker plaintiff should be able to convince the court that she has
raised a jury question. In Cipollone I, the one case in which a plaintiff put
forth an alternative design (the palladium cigarette), defendants did not
attempt to dismiss the cause of action on the ground that no reasonable jury
could find that the palladium cigarette was a reasonable alternative. 683
F. Supp. 1487, 1493 (D.N.J. 1988). Instead, the defendants argued that
proximate cause could not be satisfied, an argument that carried the day. Id.
at 1493, 1495; see supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
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2. The Consumer Sovereignty Argument: Why Consumer
Choice Is Not Dispositive on the Question of Liability
Because low-yield cigarettes are an actual alternative,
available on the market, and rejected by many smokers, defen-
dants may argue that "consumer sovereignty" should preclude
liability. Undoubtedly, consumer preferences deserve significant
weight in the risk-utility balance; indeed, consumer expectations
and marketability of the product are explicitly cited factors in
the new Restatement'97 and are considered by most courts 9
which have entertained design defect claims. However, the
simple fact that the plaintiff smoker chose the more dangerous
version of the product is not dispositive.
The reality is that even in cases where the plaintiff chose
the more dangerous design, liability often follows. For example,
in Reed v. Chrysler Corp.,'99 the Iowa Supreme Court upheld
a design defect claim in which the plaintiff alleged that the steel
top for a Jeep CJ-7 was a better alternative design than the
fiberglass top he bought.0 0 The steel top was available on
other Jeep models, and, in fact, steel tops were the industry
standard at the time of manufacture.2"' Similarly, in a case
involving a riding lawnmower, the plaintiff stated a cause of
action for defective design when the mower failed to include a
"deadman's control," a safety device that stops the mower blades
when the operator is not in control of the machine. 20 2 This
197 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 1,
1994).
19 See, e.g., Troja v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 488 A.2d 516, 519-20 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1985) (discussing the balancing process for determining
whether a product is unreasonably dangerous, the court cites "the chances of
consumer acceptance of a model incorporating such features" as an important
factor in the risk-utility analysis) (citing Singleton v. Int'l Harvester Co., 685
F.2d 112, 115-16 (4th Cir. 1981)).
199 494 N.W.2d 224 (Iowa 1992).
200 Id. at 228.
201 Id. at 227-28.
202 Ames v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 514 A.2d 352 (Conn. App. Ct. 1986)
(holding that the trial court properly instructed the jury that in determining
whether the lawnmower was defective, it could consider both the existence of
other mowers containing such devices and the absence of a warning regarding
a lack of a deadman's control on the mower in question). This case illustrates
yet another problem with the consumer sovereignty argument, namely, the
injured bystander who had no involvement in choosing the more dangerous
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device was feasible and on the market when the mower was
purchased.0 3 Indeed, the plaintiff might have chosen the
riding mower, for example, in part because it lacked the safety
device. Safety devices such as a deadman's control are often
annoying, imposing more safety than some consumers might
like.0 4 Nonetheless, the duty to provide reasonably safe prod-
ucts is one imposed by law, and unless cigarettes are to occupy
a preferred position in our tort system, courts must recognize
alternative designs of presently marketed cigarettes in design
defect cases.20 5
Refusal to consider alternative designs for cigarettes on the
market contravenes the important principle in tort law that
industry standards are relevant in determining standards of due
care. Since The T.J. Hooper case, in which Judge Learned
Hand held that industry practice is relevant but not dispositive
on the question of negligence,20 6 courts have looked to confor-
mance with industry standards in determining tort liability.0 7
In the context of products liability, industry or government
standards are relevant to the issue of whether the design of the
design.
2"s Id. at 355; see also Gootee v. Colt Indus., Inc., 712 F.2d 1057, 1065-66
(6th Cir. 1983) (applying Michigan law) (holding that it was error to exclude
evidence of alternative design developed by others in the gun industry).
204 Cf Donald P. Judges, Of Rocks and Hard Places: The Value of Risk
Choice, 42 EMORY L.J. 1 (1993) (arguing that the current tort system inter-
feres with individual autonomy and should be altered to recognize and
accommodate the desires of consumers who may make informed decisions to
engage in activities that may involve more risk than 'reasonable' or 'average'
consumers would tolerate).
205 See, e.g., Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652 (1st Cir.
1981).. The court upheld a design defect claim where the plaintiff alleged that
she had been injured by the high concentration of estrogen in an oral contra-
ceptive when a safer version of the pill was available and was marketed by the
defendant manufacturer. Id. at 654-55. This case presented a particularly
strong case for liability because defendant Ortho sold the oral contraceptive
which injured the plaintiff even though it had developed a pill that contained
half as much estrogen, and was as effective in preventing pregnancy as the
higher dose. Id. at 655 n.4.
206 60 F.2d 737, 739-40 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662 (1932).
207 See, e.g., Krzywicki v. Tidewater Equip. Co., 600 F. Supp. 629, 635-36
(D. Md. 1985) (holding that industry practice was relevant but not controlling
in a determination of negligence); Rucker v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 396
N.E.2d 534, 536 (Ill. 1979) (stating that "evidence of compliance with federal
standards is relevant to the issue of whether a product is defective").
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product is defective. 2°" Normally, for product manufacturers
who do not follow industry standards, plaintiffs use failure to
conform as a sword." 9 The consumer sovereignty argument
would turn failure to conform to industry standards into a
shield, so long as the more dangerous design was available on
the market and some consumers chose it. This would violate a
well-established principle (the relevance of industry standards),
and provide a defense for companies making riskier products
than the industry as a whole.21 °
The proper place for consumer preferences is one factor in
the risk-utility balancing of alternative designs.21' Making
consumer sovereignty a dispositive concept by refusing to
consider available and marketed alternative designs would
overturn much case law and fly in the face of common sense.
208 See, e.g., Anderson v. Hyster Co., 385 N.E.2d 690 (Ill. 1979) (holding
that defective design may be proved by non-conformance with industry
standards or the availability of alternative designs at the time of manufac-
ture); Alderman v. Wysong & Miles Co., 486 So. 2d 673, 679 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1986) (finding that industry standards are admissible in design defect
case).
209 See, e.g., Robinson v. G.G.C. Inc., 808 P.2d 522, 525-27 (Nev. 1991)
(holding evidence of industry standards admissible in design defect case);
Rodgers v. Harris Corp., Civ. A. No. 86-5282 1989 WL 73803 (E.D. Pa. June
27, 1989) (admitting evidence of competitor's design in design defect case);
Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 371, 382 (Mo. 1986) (en
banc) (upholding a $1.5 million judgment for airplane crash plaintiffs on the
strength of evidence that the manufacturer failed to design component parts
in keeping with industry standards).
210 Alternative designs available at the time the product was sold, in one
respect, present the strongest case for liability. Remember that before a
plaintiff can argue that the alternative design is reasonable in light of all the
risk-utility factors, she must show that it is feasible. To do so the plaintiff will
produce expert testimony regarding the feasibility of prototypes that arguably
could have been adopted by the defendant, but were not. See, e.g., Lake v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., No. 90-1787, 1991 WL 114440, at *3 (6th Cir.
June 27, 1991) (dismissing design defect claim because plaintiff failed to offer
sufficient evidence of the feasibility of the purported alternative design).
However, in cases like Lake, defendants can impugn the designs developed by
plaintiffs as abstractions, rather than real-world, practical possibilities. In the
case of an alternative design marketed by the defendant or a competitor, the
design cannot be dismissed as unworkable. See id. at *3 & n.3.
211 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994)
(listing nine non-exhaustive factors to guide courts in design defect cases;
factor number nine is "marketability"). See supra note 150 and accompanying
text. In addition, defendants can argue that the best evidence of the utility of
a product is that large numbers of consumers choose to use it.
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Indeed, if some jurisdictions are willing to consider subsequent
design changes as relevant to the feasibility and reasonableness
of alternative designs,212 "then evidence of prior or contempo-
raneous design features are certainly relevant and admissible to
prove that the product in question [is] defective." '213
3. The Scope of Liability Under a Reasonable Alternative
Design Standard
Unlike O'Brien liability, a reasonable alternative design
standard does not impose categorical liability, meaning that this
standard would implicate only the most dangerous cigarettes,
while allowing less dangerous cigarettes to stay on the mar-
ket.214 In fact, the tort system would channel smokers from
high-yield to low-yield cigarettes by including the internalized
costs of tort judgments in the price of high-yield cigarettes.
The limit on liability for higher yield cigarettes would be
the ability of injured smokers to establish causation. The key
evidence on this issue are studies that compare mortality rates
for high, medium, and low-tar cigarette smoking.1 5 Even if
plaintiffs can persuade courts to adopt an "enhancement of the
injury" approach, the law still requires plaintiffs to show that
the alternative design would have produced a different outcome
or at least a real reduction in the risk of harm.1 6 Therefore,
the evidence becomes persuasive only when smokers can point
to large disparities in safety between the cigarette actually
smoked and the low-yield cigarette. Smokers who have con-
sumed cigarettes with upwards of 40 mg of tar can point to
studies showing that these cigarettes cause cancer at a higher
rate than low-yield cigarettes. On the other hand, plaintiff
smokers who have consumed relatively low-tar or medium-tar
212 See Ault v. International Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Cal. 1975)
(en banc) (admitting evidence that manufacturers substituted a safer alterna-
tive three years after plaintiffs injury occurred); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v.
Beck, 624 P.2d 790, 793-94 (Alaska 1981); Shaffer v. Honeywell, Inc., 249
N.W.2d 251, 257 n.7 (S.D. 1976).
213 Ames v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 514 A.2d 352,355 (Conn. App. Ct. 1986).
214 Moreover, victims of heart disease could not bring successful lawsuits
under this theory since medical evidence shows that low-yield cigarettes do not
reduce the risk of heart disease. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
215 See THE CHANGING CIGARETrE, supra note 172, at 82-84 (fig. 2).
2 ' See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
1994] 377
378 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol.3:343
cigarettes will probably be unable to show that the failure to
adopt the low-yield design caused their injury.
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that design defect is a
viable cause of action. The general standard of a reasonable
alternative design is a well-established legal principle.21
Moreover, cigarette manufacturers have developed feasible
prototypes that are somewhat safer, that many consumers
accept, and that diminish the usefulness of the product only on
the margins. Under these circumstances, smoker plaintiffs can
avoid summary judgment, allowing juries to decide the close
question of whether high-yield cigarettes are defective in light
of the costs and benefits of alternative designs.
B. DESIGN DEFECT THEORY AS PART OF THE TOBACCO
CONTROL EFFORT
This section discusses design defect theory as a means of
imposing liability on tobacco manufacturers and sellers, and
asks whether, as a matter of public policy, litigation of this type
is desirable. Because the tort system currently imposes costs on
all types of products, there exists no compelling justification for
exempting extremely dangerous products such as cigarettes.218
1. Public Policy Supports the Use of the Reasonable
Alternative Design Test for Cigarettes
The many problems associated with broad-based risk-utility
(O'Brien)219 simply do not present themselves with the limited
risk-utility balancing of the reasonable alternative design test.
Paul Crist and John Majoras, lawyers for R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., attempt to apply their preemption argument 220 to all de-
sign defect theories, based on the notion that federal statutes
217 See discussion supra parts I.E.3, II.B; see, e.g., Kotler v. American
Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217, 1225 (1st Cir. 1990) (under Massachusetts
warranty law, "a safer alternative design is a sine qua non for the imposition
of liability").
218 This position is consistent with the principles underlying the new
Restatement's rejection of the Restatement (Second)'s comment i to § 402A,
which had explicitly exempted cigarettes from the otherwise expanding field
of products liability. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. c (Tentative
Draft No. 1, 1994); see also discussion supra part II.D.
219 See discussion supra part II.A.
22 See supra notes 126-129 and accompanying text.
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implicitly preclude almost all liability for tobacco compa-
nies.22 ' Of course, this would be a very broad reading of
Congress' intent, and would extend the preemption doctrine
farther than any court that has considered the issue.22 More-
over, those skeptical of O'Brien from a legal process point of
view endorse the reasonable alternative design standard.223
In fact, the new Restatement rejects O'Brien but holds open the
possibility of cigarette liability under the alternative design
approach.224 In sum, reasonable alternative design as applied
to cigarettes is a judicially manageable standard, and does not
contravene or infringe upon federal legislation.
2. Litigation as a Means of Suppressing Cigarette
Consumption
Cigarettes may be found defective under the reasonable
alternative design standard, which would put them on equal
footing with all other products. As a public policy choice,
however, the reasonable alternative design theory may be
undesirable because litigation itself is ill-equipped to solve many
of the problems associated with tobacco consumption.225 Indis-
putably, design defect liability would provide significant com-
pensation for smokers who develop cancer or other ailments due
to tobacco use. From a fairness perspective, compensation for
221 See Crist & Majoras, supra note 37, at 578-82.
See, e.g., Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230, 234 (6th
Cir. 1988). The Supreme Court in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. (Cipollone
I), 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992), did not consider whether design defect claims were
preempted by federal statutes, probably because no lower court had ever
adopted that interpretation.
' See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 96, at 627. Compare Liability Without
Defect, supra note 115 (Henderson and Twerski argue against adoption of
O'Brien-type liability) with Revision of § 402A, supra note 12, at 1520 (Hen-
derson and Twerski argue for the reasonable alternative design standard).
224 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 1,
1994). To be clear, Henderson and Twerski reject cigarette liability under the
O'Brien approach. See id. § 2 cmt. c, reporters' notes. The Reporters, howev-
er, do not take a position in the new Restatement on how tobacco would be
treated under the reasonable alternative design approach, but leave that
determination to the courts. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
' Some tobacco control advocates see litigation as a means of exposing the
tobacco companies' "knavery," thereby lessening their political influence. See
Daynard et al., supra note 98, at S38. This is a dubious goal, in light of the
enormous costs of mass litigation.
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smoking-related injuries is justifiable on the grounds that those
who profit from cigarette production should pay for the harms
caused by their products when an acceptable safer design is
available. Cigarette companies also should be forced to inter-
nalize the true costs of tobacco production; otherwise, smokers
will over-consume the product, leading to economic inefficien-
cy.226 In addition, tobacco manufacturers would also be in a
better position to spread the risk among all users of tobacco in
the form of insurance, which the market price of cigarettes
would reflect.227
The increased cost of cigarettes is an important factor in
considering how design defect liability would affect future
cigarette consumption. A common concern is that liability
would destroy the tobacco industry,2 2 and judging from the
industry's take-no-prisoners approach to litigation, it seems that
tobacco manufacturers share that perception.22 9 However, one
analyst has calculated that imposing cigarette liability would
increase the cost of a pack of cigarettes by only twenty-two
cents.23 ° Given differing opinions, and the inherent specula-
tiveness in predicting the future, the effects that design defect
liability would have on price are virtually impossible to predict.
22 See Orchard View Farms, Inc. v. Martin Marietta Aluminum Inc., 500
F. Supp. 984, 989 (D. Or. 1980) (noting that each enterprise must "bear its
total production costs," the court imposed liability for the "externalized cost"
of defendant's operations); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
cmt. c (1965) ("[Plublic policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries
caused by products intended for consumption be placed on those who market
them.").
227 See Prosser, supra note 11. Dean Prosser advances the "risk-spreading"
argument that manufacturers of defective products should absorb the losses
that result from the use of their products because they are in a better position
than those who are injured to pass these losses on to consumers through
higher prices. Id. at 1120.
22 Of course, the kind of liability proposed by this Note is confined to high-
yield cigarettes, and does not threaten the existence of the entire industry.
Additionally, the industry can choose whether to remove the higher-yield
cigarettes from the market, or keep the product and pay the judgments
against it.
229 See Rabin, supra note 10, at 857.
2'0 Mark Rust, Legal Attack on Tobacco Flares, AM. MED. NEWS, Sept. 20,
1985, at 1, 29 (discussing a Wall Street analyst's projection that "65,000 people
a year winning $100,000 each will add only twenty-two cents to the price of a
pack of cigarets [sic]."). Of course, such a modest increase might undercut the
case for liability since liability probably would do little to suppress consump-
tion.
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Regardless of the amount, any price increase will resemble
a tax in some respects, and therefore should depress demand for
the product."' Studies show, however, that demand for
tobacco is relatively inelastic, meaning that it is not very price-
sensitive.232 This means that products liability litigation must
impose significant costs on tobacco manufacturers in order to
fundamentally suppress tobacco consumption. From an efficien-
cy perspective, litigation is inferior to taxation because of its
huge transaction costs. Indeed, some estimates claim that one-
half of the money paid into the tort system goes to adminis-
trative costs.233 However, tort judgments serve an intangible
purpose that taxation does not, namely, disapproval of the
behavior which gave rise to liability.
234
In the end, the case for tobacco liability via design defect
theories relies on traditional justifications for products liability:
compensation for injuries, loss spreading, and internalization of
the product's true social costs. The effectuation of all of these
policies would benefit tobacco control efforts, primarily by
increasing the price of cigarettes. Liability would operate as an
automatic tax on cigarettes, 211 immune from the politics and
influence of tobacco companies over government taxation poli-
236cies. Finally, liability is fair. If products such as automo-
biles and appliances must face the tort system, then so should
one of the most dangerous products ever produced."7
21 David Sweanor et al., Report of the Tobacco Policy Research Study
Group on Tobacco Pricing and Taxation in the United States, TOBACCO
CONTROL, 1992:1 (Supp.), at S31, S33.
2 Id. at S32-33 (discussing various studies on the price elasticity of
tobacco). But see 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS, supra note 3, at 533-40 (discussing
the price elasticity of tobacco and price sensitive demand among teenagers).
' Stephen D. Sugarman, Personal Injury Law Doesn't Work, THE SACRA-
MENTo BEE, Sept. 24, 1989, at FO.
234 See generally Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1983)
(taking the view that many controversies should be adjudicated because of the
message that judgments send to the rest of society).
" Assuming that the tobacco companies do not choose to spread the
increased liability exposure through raised prices of different products due to
other realities of the consumer markets.
26 See Sweanor et al., supra note 231, at S32. Research shows that
cigarette taxation, when adjusted for inflation, has steadily declined since the
1950s. Id.
"' See Rabin, supra note 10, at 878.
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CONCLUSION
In the recent Cipollone II decision,23 the Supreme Court
erected a roadblock to recovery for plaintiffs in the second wave
cigarette cases. Throughout the 1980s, plaintiffs' lawyers and
commentators saw failure to warn theories as the surest path to
victory. Considering the Cipollone II holding that all post-1969
warning claims are preempted by the federal Public Health
Cigarette Smoking Act,239 plaintiffs must develop new theories
of legal liability. A design defect cause of action offers the
prospect of imposing liability on the most dangerous cigarettes.
The Tentative Draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts,
although a cautious document, is a key to this strategy because
it reverses the presumption of immunity for cigarettes and
places them on an equal footing with all other products. Con-
vincing courts that low-yield cigarettes may be a reasonable
alternative design is the central challenge facing plaintiffs. The
risk/utility balance for high-yield cigarettes presents a classic
reasonable alternative design question that juries should decide.
Encouraging this kind of design defect litigation also constitutes
good public policy; cigarette manufacturers do not deserve
preferential treatment in the tort system, but must instead bear
the true costs of their activities.
Alex J. Grantt
23 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
29 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1988).
t Candidate for J.D., 1995. I would like to thank Amy Ralph for her
insight and dedication in helping me prepare this Note for publication. I
would also like to thank Professors James A. Henderson, Jr. and Richard J.
Bonnie for their help in developing and clarifying many of the issues present-
ed in this Note.
